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THE DEFINITION OF ABUSE UNDER THE
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978:
OFFICE OF CONSUMERS' COUNSEL v.
FERC
I. INTRODUCTION
To encourage increased gas production, Congress partially deregu-
lated the natural gas industry when it passed the Natural Gas Policy Act
(NGPA) in 1978.1 Section 601(c) of the NGPA guarantees passthrough
of gas acquisition costs by pipelines to customers, providing that any
amount paid to producers shall be deemed "just and reasonable" if the
gas is deregulated or if the price paid does not exceed the ceiling price.2
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission)
may not deny passthrough unless it determines that the amount paid to
producers was "excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds."3 The
Commission has held that "abuse" means an acquisition policy which
shows a reckless disregard of the pipeline's fundamental duty to provide
service at the lowest, reasonable rate and has a "significant, adverse ef-
fect" on the customer or consumer.4 Both pipelines and consumer
groups challenged this interpretation of abuse in Office of Consumers'
Counsel v. FER C.5
Editor's Note: The editor thanks Christie Day, Editor in Chief of the ENERGY LAW JOURNAL, for
her assistance in preparing this note for publication.
1. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3432 (1982)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2) (1982). In addition to some types of gas being totally deregulated,
the Commission's ratemaking authority over first sales of other types of natural gas was abrogated
by NGPA provisions calling for "maximum lawful prices" to act as ceilings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-
3319, 3431(a)(1) (1982). A first sale of natural gas is defined under the Act as gas that was not
committed or dedicated to interstate commerce when the NGPA was enacted. 15 U.S.C.
§ 3431(a)(1) (1982).
"Passthrough," a term of art in the natural gas industry, is a provision of a price control law or
regulation permitting certain increased costs to be "passed through" to customers by allowable price
increases. McCulloch Gas Transm. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 173, 180 (Wyo. 1981). It
is significant that the amounts paid be deemed "just and reasonable" because rates subject to regula-
tion under the NGA are unlawful unless they are "just and reasonable." 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1982).
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2) (1982).
4. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. % 61,034 at 61,100 (1984) [hereinafter Opinion
No. 204]. Normally a customer is a utility company that purchases gas directly from a pipeline and
a consumer is one who purchases from the the utility.
5. 783 F.2d 206, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Consumers' Counsel]. Petitioners were
1
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background. The Regulatory Framework
Natural gas in interstate commerce is regulated by the FERC under
authority granted in the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA),6 and the
NGPA.7
Section 4 of the NGA governs the rates that a pipeline may charge.'
In practice, a pipeline sets its rates using any one of a variety of ratemak-
ing methods.9 The Commission then uses a cost-of-service analysis,
which takes into account the expenses of acquiring and transporting gas
and a reasonable rate of return for the pipeline, ' 0 in determining whether
the rates satisfy the "just and reasonable" standard mandated by section
4 of the NGA. 11 If a rate increase is sought, the pipeline bears the bur-
Columbia, intervenors (Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp., Transwestern Pipe Line Co.), and amicus curiae El Paso Natural Gas Co., who contended
that the Commission's interpretation of abuse was too expansive. Other petitioners protested that
the Commission's standard for abuse was too narrow. This group consisted of the Office of Consum-
ers' Counsel, State of Ohio, Associated Gas Distributors, Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., Cities of
Charlottesville and Richmond, Virginia, Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, the Process Gas Consum-
ers Group, and Public Service Commission of the State of New York. The Georgia Industrial
Group, the American Iron and Steel Institute, Maryland Peoples' Counsel, Office of Consumer Ad-
vocate for the Commonwealth of Pa., and UGI Corporation filed intervenors' briefs supporting these
petitioners. Id. at 211-12 nn.1-2.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982). One of the purposes of the NGA was to "protect customers
against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 610 (1944). Originally, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) only regulated interstate
pipelines, but in 1954 the Supreme Court extended the Commission's regulatory authority under the
NGA to sales by producers to interstate pipelines. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S.
672 (1954).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). In enacting the NGPA, it was Congress' intention to alle-
viate gas shortages and stimulate the natural gas industry. Ringleb, The Natural Gas Regulatory
Dilemma: A Market Solution, Another Compromise, or the Status Quo?, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'VY
107 (1985). For background on the NGPA, see Hollis & Strohl, Squaring the Circle: Implementing
the Agricultural Use Exemption from Incremental Pricing Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 NAT.
REsOURcES LAW. 419 (1981); Means, Issues in the Debate over Natural Gas Decontrol, PuB. UrIL.
FORT., Oct. 28, 1982, at 18; Mogel & Mapes, Assessment of Incremental Pricing Under the Natural
Gas Policy Act, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 763, 774-80 (1980); Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regula-
tion and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. Rv. 345 (1983). In 1977, Congress
passed the Department of Energy Organization Act, which eliminated the FPC and created the
FERC. Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375 (1982)).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1982).
9. See infra note 14.
10. Brief for Respondent FERC at 3, Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC (D.C. Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. Gas acquisition costs are averages of the costs of gas purchased
from many sources. High-cost gas can be "rolled-in" with its "cushion" of low-priced gas. Consum-
ers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 213 n.3.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1982). Under section 4 of the NGA, rates are charged through a cost-
of-service filing (this filing is sometimes referred to as a full-scale section 4 review; see infra note 15).
Thereafter, if a pipeline's purchasing practices are found to be "imprudent" the Commission is em-
powered to adjust the pipeline's rates as being unjust and unreasonable, even though the rates were
2
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den of proof that the requested rates are "just and reasonable." If a party
or the Commission wants a rate changed, that party must show that the
present rate is unjust and unreasonable. 12 Section 5 of the NGA gives
the Commission the authority to hold hearings to determine if rates,
rules, regulations, practices, or contracts are unjust and unreasonable. If
the Commission finds that they are unjust and unreasonable, it may re-
form them. 13
In 1972, the FPC established the Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA)
alternative for adjusting pipeline rates.14 Rather than going through a
full section 4 review, interstate pipelines "may submit a special
'purchased gas adjustment' filing biannually to adjust their rates for in-
creases or decreases in the cost of gas they purchase from suppliers.""
The pipeline must file for a full section 4 review after three years. 6
When the NGPA was passed in 1978, it changed the regulatory
structure of natural gas. To encourage increased gas production, Con-
originally found to be just and reasonable in the absence of imprudent practices by the pipeline. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1982); Phillips Petroleum, 347 U.S. 672; Columbia Gas Dev. Corp. v.
FERC, 651 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1981). Imprudence under the NGA automatically renders
rates unjust and unreasonable. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 777 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FERC, 765 F.2d 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(while imprudence will automatically render rates unjust and unreasonable under the NGA, rates
may be declared unjust and unreasonable for other reasons even if the pipeline acted prudently).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1982).
14. See Purchased Gas Cost Adjustment Provision in Natural Gas Pipeline Companies' FPC
Gas Tariffs, Order No. 452, 47 F.P.C. 1049 (1972); see also Order No. 452-A, 47 F.P.C. 1510 (1972).
Past methods used by the Commission to adjust rates have included decreasing the rate of return to
the pipeline or changing the distribution of fixed costs by increasing the amount of fixed costs as-
signed to the demand component of the rates for the purpose of responding to competition or en-
couraging more efficient use of a pipeline's facilities. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520
F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Normally a pipeline's rates consist of a demand charge and a
commodity charge. "The demand charge is usually a fixed rate billed on the basis of the maximum
volume of gas a customer is entitled to purchase and on a given day, while the commodity charge is
billed on the basis of the actual units of gas taken." Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 217 n.23. The
commodity charge is calculated to recover all the variable costs plus a certain percentage of fixed
costs. A pipeline risks underrecovery of fixed costs "if it fails to achieve the sales volume used to
calculate its rates." Id. For more information about pipeline ratemaking, see Wisconsin Gas Co. v.
FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985); A. TUSSING & C. BARLOWV, THE NATURAL GAS
INDUSTRY (1984); Note, Elimination of Variable Costs From Gas Minimum Bills: Wisconsin Gas
Co. v. FERC, 7 ENERGY L.J. 131 (1986).
15. 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(4) (1986). Under a full-scale section 4 review, the Commission scru-
tinizes a pipeline's rates to ascertain whether they meet the just and reasonable standards mandated
by the NGA. On the other hand, under the PGA alternative, pipelines will estimate their purchase
costs for a six month period and, if accepted by the Commission, will collect them from their rate-
payers. After the six months have elapsed, the actual gas costs are compared to the estimated costs.
If the actual costs exceed the estimated costs, the difference is made up through a surcharge. If the
estimated costs are greater than the actual costs, a refund is in order. Brief for Respondent, see supra
note 10, at 4 n.7. See 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(4)(iv)(d) (1986).
16. Id. § 154.38 (d)(4)(vi)(a) (1986).
3
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gress partially deregulated many categories of gas.17 A ceiling which
eliminated the Commission's ratemaking authority was placed on well-
head prices for first sales of natural gas.18 Section 107, or "high-cost",
gas was exempted from all federal regulation.19
Because the deregulation only applied to producers, and interstate
pipelines were still subject to FERC regulation, Congress excepted gas
acquisition costs from pipeline regulation.20 Section 601 of the NGPA
coordinates the NGPA with the NGA by specifying the effects of the
NGPA on specific provisions in the NGA, which still regulates pipe-
lines.2" If a category of gas is deregulated or if the price does not exceed
its ceiling, any amount paid in a first sale is deemed just and reasonable.22
Having declared the price to be just and reasonable, the Commission may
not deny passthrough of the gas acquisition costs to the pipeline's cus-
tomers "except to the extent the Commission determines that the amount
paid was excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds."23 This ex-
ception to the guaranteed passthrough of gas acquisition costs was at
issue in Consumers' Counsel24
17. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 213.
18. Id. First sales include sales to pipelines by independent producers and the pipeline's own
production. Id. at 213 n.7; 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1) (1982).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1)(B)(i) (1982). Section 107 gas includes gas produced from wells that
are completed below 15,000 feet, gas produced from geopressured brine, occluded gas from coal
seams, gas produced from Devonian shale, and gas "produced under such other conditions as the
Commission determines to present extraordinary risks or costs." 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(5) (1982). The
Commission determined that section 107 gas includes the first sale of natural gas produced from
tight formations and qualified production enhancement gas. 18 C.F.R. § 271.701 (1986). A tight
formation is a sedimentary layer of rock cemented together in a way that hinders the flow of gas
through the rock. Production enhancement gas is gas recovered as a result of secondary and tertiary
recovery techniques. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 908 (6th ed.
1984).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 3431 (1982). "[T]he provisions of the Natural Gas Act and the jurisdiction of
the Commission under such act shall not apply" to first sales of natural gas which were not commit-
ted or dedicated. Id. § 3431(a)(1)(A). The provisions also do not apply for first sales of committed
or dedicated gas if it is high-cost natural gas, new natural gas, or if it is produced from any new,
onshore production well. Id. § 3431(a)(1)(B). Any amount paid (acquisition costs) in any first sale
is just and reasonable if it does not exceed its ceiling or if it has been deregulated. Id.
§ 3431o)(1)(A).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 3431 (1982). Section 3431(a) of the NGPA coordinates with section l(b) of the
NGA (15 U.S.C. § 717(b)) and section 3431(b) of the NGPA coordinates with sections 4 and 5 of
the NGA (15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d). Section 3431(c)(1) of the NGPA is an exception to section 7 of
the NGA (15 U.S.C. § 717(f)) and section 3431(c)(2) of the NGPA is an exception to sections 4 and
5 of the NGA (15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d).
22. Id. § 3431(b).
23. Id. § 3431(c)(2).
24. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
4
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B. Facts: The Definition of Fraud, Abuse, or Similar Grounds
After the passage of the NGPA in 1978, Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corporation (Columbia) began purchasing deregulated section 107
gas. Although the average cost of gas from all of its sources was $2.93
per Mcf during one six-month period in 1981-82,25 Columbia entered
into some contracts for 107 gas, at prices over $8.00 per Mcf.26 Colum-
bia attempted to pass through the added costs to its customers by filing
for two PGAs.27 Several protestors challenged the filings, alleging abuse
in the section 107 purchases.28 The Commission held a hearing to deter-
mine the truth of those allegations.29
Prior to the hearing, the Commission stated that the word "abuse"
in the "fraud, abuse, or similar grounds" language "does not refer to
imprudence but to serious improprieties."30 The Commission stressed
that the "protestants have a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate the
impropriety that would trigger the 'fraud, abuse, or similar grounds' ba-
sis for denying passthrough of costs." 31 The Commission later reaffirmed
that imprudent practices by the pipeline in acquiring gas, the NGA stan-
dard for finding gas acquisition costs to be unjust and unreasonable, do
"not of [themselves] constitute abuse under section 601(c) of the
NGPA. ''1 2 To alleviate confusion and give Columbia and the interven-
25. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., Initial Decision, 22 F.E.R.C. 1 63,093, at 65,320, 65,361
n.16 (1982) [hereinater Initial Decision]. The decision was published earlier, but information which
was subject to a protective order was omitted from the first publication. 21 F.E.R.C. 63,100
(1982). The protective order was subsequently lifted on February 8, 1983. 22 F.E.R.C. 61,137.
26. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,097. Columbia argued that it needed this gas to ensure
a steady supply plus a reasonable surplus, a surplus being necessary to combat potential shortages
that past experience had shown may occur. Id. at 61,117. Columbia relied on its ability as a pipeline
to "roll in" (average) the high-cost gas with its cushion of low-cost gas. "Rolled-in pricing, with
only a few exceptions, has been Commission policy for quite some time." Initial Decision, 22
F.E.R.C. at 65,334; see supra note 10.
27. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 14 F.E.R.C. 1 61,202 (1981); Columbia Gas Transm. Corp.,
16 F.E.R.C. 61,160 (1981).
28. See infra note 58. The protestors argued that the price Columbia paid for section 107 gas
would exceed the market clearing price, except for Columbia's ability to roll in those costs with its
lower priced gas. Although the record supported this argument, Columbia's ability to roll in
brought its gas acquisition costs below the market clearing price. Therefore, "the merits of rolled-in
pricing [were] not for determination." Initial Decision, 22 F.E.R.C. at 65,334; see supra notes 10 &
26.
29. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 14 F.E.R.C. at 61,380. Among the allegations made by the
protestors was that Columbia made excessive purchases of section 107 gas, resulting in an excessive
surplus on its system. 26 F.E.R.C. , 61,034 at 61,116 (1984).
30. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 14 F.E.R.C. at 61,380. See infra note 33 and accompanying
text.
31. Id.
32. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 15 F.E.R.C. 61,104 at 61,227 (1981). The Commission
made it clear that the NGA imprudence standard and the NGPA abuse standard are not the same.
5
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ors a tentative standard on which to formulate strategy for litigation, the
FERC issued a non-binding statement of policy in February 1982. 33 In
this statement the Commission defined the elements of section 601(c) by
reference to tort law, 34 and stated that "abuse" is a "negligent misrepre-
sentation or concealment," "fraud" is "fraudulent misrepresentation or
concealment," and defined "similar grounds" as "inncocent misrepresen-
tation of fact." 35
In a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in February
and March of 1982, the ALJ reformed the definiton of "fraud, abuse or
similar grounds." The hearing addressed allegations that Columbia was
guilty of abuse in passing through the costs of its section 107 gas. 36 The
ALJ agreed with the Commission's earlier analysis that mere imprudence
is an insufficient reason for the FERC to deny passthrough of gas costs,
but he found the definition of abuse contained in the policy statement to
be too narrow. The ALJ determined that Congress intended abuse to be
something other than fraud and, because misrepresentation is an element
of fraud, it was improper to define abuse as requiring misrepresenta-
tion.37 While abuse may encompass misrepresentation, other inappropri-
ate activities may fall under its meaning as well. The ALJ found that
abuse fell somewhere between imprudence and fraud but did not give a
precise definition.38
Looking at the alleged abuses in light of Congressional intent in en-
acting the NGPA, the ALJ considered the intent behind section 601(c). 3 9
To some extent therefore, the NGPA § 601(c) standard abrogates the NGA standard. However,
some NGA sections 4 and 5 violations remain intact. See Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 224. In
addition, § 601(c) of the NGPA specifically incorporates NGA sections 4 and 5 by making deregu-
lated gas and gas that does not exceed its ceiling price "just and reasonable" by definition. See supra
notes 2 & 21 and accompanying text.
33. F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., REGULATIONS PREAMBLES, 1982-85, q 30,336 at 30,103 (1982).
34. Id. at 30,110-15. The Commission found a lack of clear legislative guidance as to the mean-
ing of the fraud standard. Similarly, common law principles fail to disclose a consistent definition.
Fraud is a "term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case." Id. at 30,110 (citing W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 684 (4th ed. 1971)). The Commission reviewed vari-
ous sources of law and found misrepresentation to be the common thread in the various definitions.
Elements of intent and scienter were also common. Id. at 30,110-13. "Abuse" was also difficult to
define. "Disregard of a duty" was a common element, but whether it must be intentional was not
clear. Because intent was required for "fraud," the Commission eliminated it from "abuse" so that
negligent misrepresentations would be covered by the latter. Id. at 30,113. Because Congress in-
tended that "similar grounds" would cover similar conduct that might escape the terms "fraud" and
"abuse," the Commission felt it was reasonable that innocent misrepresentations would be encom-
passed in this element. Id.
35. Id.
36. Initial Decision, 22 F.E.R.C. at 65,322-23.
37. Id. at 65,332-33.
38. Id. at 65,333.
39. Id. at 65,346.
[Vol. 22:625
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In so doing the ALJ determined that Columbia had been cutting back
purchases of low-cost regulated gas while continuing to take high-cost
gas above the take-or-pay level." This practice increased purchase gas
costs, which Columbia attempted to pass through to its customers during
the PGA periods under consideration.41
The ALJ determined that, although "Congress was concerned with
precluding any indirect regulation of excessive deregulated gas prices re-
sulting from imprudent purchases," Columbia's activities were "unre-
lated to the payment of a particular price for deregulated gas as a result
of imprudence.... . 42 The impropriety of Columbia's practice of cutting
back on low-cost gas was at issue and, according to the ALJ, Congress
does not guarantee passthrough under these circumstances. The NGPA
provided for partial and phased deregulation of natural gas. However,
allowing pipelines to cut back on purchases of low-cost regulated gas in
favor of higher cost section 107 and other types of partially deregulated
gas could effectively remove price-regulated gas from the market. These
practices would contravene the Congressional intent to continue the sale
of price-regulated gas.43 Columbia's cutbacks were found to be serious
violations of its fundamental obligation to provide gas at the lowest rea-
sonable price and to have resulted in "excessive" payments for gas
purchases.' The ALJ held the practices to be "abuse" under section
601(c)(2) of the NGPA and, thus, denied passthrough of the excessive
costs that resulted from the abuse.4 No other conduct by Columbia was
found to constitute abuse under the NGPA.46
In January of 1984, the Commission reviewed the ALJ's decision in
Opinion No. 204, affirming in part and reversing in part.4' The Commis-
sion, like the ALJ, rejected the definition of "abuse" which appeared in
its earlier policy statement48 and articulated a new two-part test. It ex-
panded abuse to include: (1) "circumstances where a pipeline's gas ac-
40. Id. at 65,345. Among the reasons Columbia offered in defense of its cutback practices were
that producers generally have the contractual right to make operational decisions for the production
of a lease or field, Columbha may be required to purchase higher-priced volumes above take-or-pay
levels to satisfy delivery obligations to third parties, and some higher-priced gas is used to directly
serve Columbia's customers, and this gas cannot be shut in or these customers would be curtailed.
41. Id.




46. Id. at 65,333-53.
47. 26 F.E.R.C. 61,034 (1984).
48. See F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., REGULATIONS PREAMBLES 30,336 (1982); see also supra
notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text.
7
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quisition policies and practices evidence a reckless disregard of the
pipeline's fundamental duty to provide service at the lowest reasonable
cost, and (2) such policies have significant, adverse consequences" on cus-
tomers or consumers.4 9 The "reckless disregard" standard was viewed
as "an aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than in
degree from ordinary lack of care or imprudence, but does not require a
showing of intent to cause harm." 0 The second prong of the test, that
the "policies have significant, adverse consequences," is satisfied if there
is a "significant, adverse effect on customers (such as a significant loss of
market) or consumers."'" The Commission found that Columbia's cut-
back practices did not have a "significant, adverse effect on customers or
consumers" and reversed the AL's finding that the practices were
abusive. 2
The Commission formulated this test in light of pipeline regulation
tenets53 and its interpretation of the NGPA. 4  Historically, pipeline
rates have been set so that ratepayers pay "only necessary and reasonable
costs of service ' 55 and so that the pipeline can earn a just and reasonable
return under "efficient and economical management."5 6 The guaranteed
passthrough right in section 601(c)(2) includes a duty of the pipeline to
take reasonable measures to minimize costs.57
In Opinion No. 204-A, a rehearing that largely affirmed Opinion No.
204, the Commission defended its reading of the NGPA against argu-
ments from various parties,58 some arguing that the definition of "abuse"
49. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,100 (emphasis added). The initial policy statement
defined abuse as "misrepresentation," an element of fraud. However, "abuse" may include inappro-
priate activities, in addition to misrepresentation. 22 F.E.R.C. at 65,333. See supra note 35.
50. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,100.
51. Id.
52. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,103. The Commission's review was limited to the
March 1981-February 1982 period at issue. "[Wle are concerned that these practices carry signifi-
cant potential for causing market loss in the future." Id.
53. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,100. "It is a long-standing tenet of pipeline regulation
that a pipeline must provide service in an efficient manner." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Midwestern Gas Transm. Co., 36 F.P.C. 61, 70-71 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 444
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968)).
56. Id. (quoting Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 693 (1923)).
57. Id.
58. The parties were Exxon Corp., Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Public Service Com-
mission of New York, Associated Gas Distributors, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Office of Con-
sumer Advocate of Pennsylvania, Washington Gas Light Co., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.,
Cities of Charlottesville and Richmond, Virginia, Process Gas Consumers Group, Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America, UGI Corp., Office of Consumers' Counsel, Energy Action Project of
the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, and Senator Howard Metzenbaum. Id. at 61,334.
[Vol. 22:625
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was too narrow, and others arguing that it was too broad.5 9 With regard
to the first part of its test, the Commission determined that "abuse" is
not equivalent to "imprudence" (the NGA standard) because Congress
intended the NGPA to guarantee passthrough of gas costs, subject only
to certain exceptions." If imprudence were one of those exceptions there
would have been no point in passing section 601(c)(2) because the criteria
for denial of passthrough would be the same as the original criteria found
in sections 4 and 5 of the NGA. Further, it would be illogical for Con-
gress to intend for imprudence to be an exception to the guarantee and
"revert back to precisely the same standard for the Commission review of
gas costs ... as existed under the NGA. '61 The Commission concluded
that Congress intended to provide it with "enforcement authority that is
narrower than the general review authority provided under the NGA. 62
The second part of the test, requiring that the reckless conduct must
have a significant, adverse effect on customers and consumers, came
under attack by the protestants as being too narrow. Some parties ar-
gued that while, in tort law, disregard of a duty coupled with a loss or
damage to the innocent party can justify an award of punitive damages,
the effect of a pipeline's conduct should be irrelevant in determining
abuse under section 601(c)(2).6 3 The Commission dismissed this asser-
tion by stating that this case is not an action in tort.' Because Congress
intended section 601(c)(2) to limit FERC regulation of certain types of
gas to "exceptional circumstances," conduct by a pipeline "must have
more than an insignificant effect on the public to be abusive. "65
Opinion 204-A explained the application of the two-part abuse stan-
dard of section 601(c)(2) to determine what gas costs may be denied.
Passthrough of gas costs may not be denied unless "the amount paid was
59. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,334 (1984) [hereinafter Opinion No.
204-A].
60. Id. at 61,710.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 61,711.
63. Id. at 61,712.
64. Id. This appears to be self-contradictory. The Commission itself defined "fraud, abuse, or
similar grounds" by reference to tort law. See supra notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text. When
the original "abuse" standard (misrepresentation) was abandoned in favor of the "reckless disregard
of its duty" prong of the new test, the Commission used tort law to explain the parameters of the
new test. It stated that between intent to do harm, and the mere unreasonable risk of harm involved
in ordinary negligence, there is "quasi intent" which includes "willful," "wanton," and "reckless."
Opinion No. 204-A, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,712 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
184 (4th ed. 1971)).
65. 26 F.E.R.C. at 61, 711-13.
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excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds. '66 The abuse must
cause "excessive" payments and only those excessive payments may be
denied. The determination of when the amount paid becomes "exces-
sive" is the critical factor.67
III. CONSUMERS' COUNSEL v FERC
The court in Consumers' Counsel began its inquiry into the FERC's
interpretation of "abuse" by ascertaining "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' 68 If the intent of Congress is
clear, both courts and agencies must adhere to that intent. If Congress
has not directly addressed the issue, the court may not impose its own
construction of the statute but must determine if the agency's construc-
tion is "within the permissable [sic] range of interpretations. ' 69 The
agency's construction need not be the only permissible one nor even be
the one the court would have chosen had it decided the question
initially.70
The Consumers' Counsel court looked at the NGA and NGPA as a
whole, and specifically focused on section 601(c). 71 It noted that section
601(c) guarantees passthrough of gas acquisition costs that are just and
reasonable. Section 601(b) states that any amount paid is just and rea-
sonable if the gas is deregulated or if it has not exceeded its ceiling
price.72 The court then examined the exception to this guaranteed pass-
through: payments that are "excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar
grounds. '73 Proposed definitions for abuse can be placed into two cate-
gories: those which categorize abuse as a form of misrepresentation, and
66. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c) (1982).
67. 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,713. The Commission's interpretation is in line with the court's view of
§ 601(c) that excessive payments must result from "fraud, abuse, or similar grounds" for pass-
through to be denied. The Commission, however, felt that the conduct must be serious to cause a
denial of passthrough. "In light of the seriousness of the conduct which must cause an increase in
gas costs before the increased costs can be denied passthrough, we believe that all amounts paid that
are attributable to abuse are excessive." Id. The Commission's measure of serious conduct appears
to require significant, adverse effect on customers or consumers. The court's measure is the mere
existence of an excessive payment due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds. See also infra notes 90 &
91 and accompanying text.
68. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 218 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
69. Id.
70. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 11
(1984).
71. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 211, 218-23.
72. Id. at 219.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2)(B) (1982).
[Vol. 22:625
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those which equate abuse with imprudence. 74
Columbia argued that abuse should be defined as it was in the
FERC's initial policy statement. This assertion was rejected for the same
reason the FERC rejected it. If in the form of misrepresentation, abuse is
effectively read out of the statute because misrepresentation is an element
of fraud. In addition, "fraud or similar grounds" "would cover the same
spectrum of activities as would the interpretation . . . urged by
Columbia. '7
The court also rejected arguments that the Commission should
equate "abuse" with the "imprudence" or the "unjust and unreasonable"
standard of the NGA. Section 601(c) establishes a different standard, on
its face, through the "fraud, abuse, or similar grounds" language. If the
two standards were equated, there would be no reason for the section
601(c) exception because inquiries could be conducted pursuant to the
NGA. 6 Furthermore, section 601(b) defines the cost of certain cate-
gories of gas as "just and reasonable" and Congress did not intend for the
FERC to determine whether the cost of these categories of gas were just
and reasonable.77
The court found that the meager legislative history on section 601(c)
supports the position that "abuse" falls somewhere between misrepresen-
tation and imprudence. Although the "fraud, abuse, or similar grounds"
language was not in either version of the House or Senate bills, both bills
were attempting to limit the FERC's regulation of wellhead prices with
the passage of the NGPA. Thus, the "imprudence" standard could not
have been intended.78 The first mention of fraud and abuse was in a staff
report to the conference committee on the NGPA, which stated that
there was to be no indirect or "back door" regulation by the FERC but
there was also "no intention to override the inherent enforcement power
of the FERC to police fraud, abuse, etc."' 79 If the Commission could
easily deny passthrough of the prices paid to producers, it could indi-
74. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 219-20.
75. Id. at 219 (citing Opinion 204-A, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,710).
76. Id. at 220.
77. Id.
78. Id. Section 5(a) of S. 2104, which was also part of H.R. 5289, stated that "the Commission
shall have no power (1) to deny, in whole or in part, any rate or charge made... except (A) to the
extent that such rates or charges... exceed the national ceiling or interim ceiling.. . ." 123 CONG.
REc. 32,306 (1977).
79. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 220 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE AND SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., NATURAL GAS PRICING AGREEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CONFEREES ON H.R.
5289, at 19 (Comm. Print 1978)).
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rectly regulate the prices producers charged. 0
Arguments that the staff report did not reflect congressional intent
because it was written before the fraud and abuse language was added to
the statute were dismissed with the court stating that "it does reflect a
congressional concern with regulation of wellhead prices which is consis-
tent with FERC's interpretation of the statute."8" Even if the staff re-
port did not reflect congressional intent, no party produced legislative
history that was inconsistent with the Commission's position.8"
After stating that "abuse" falls somewhere between misrepresenta-
tion and imprudence, and finding that Congress has not "unambiguously
expressed [its] intent" on the definition of abuse, the court concluded
that "reckless disregard" falls within the permissible range of interpreta-
tions.83 The court noted that the Commission's reference to tort law was
not the best way to define "abuse" but did not find it inconsistent with
congressional intent, 4 and further noted that in settling upon the proper
standard there are two competing policies to be accommodated: first, the
congressional concern with "back door" regulation and, second, the
longstanding tenet of pipeline regulation that pipelines must operate effi-
ciently. The court found that the "reckless disregard" standard accom-
modates both policies.8
Although the first prong of the FERC's test was permissible, the
80. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 221.
81. Id. at 220 (emphasis in original).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 220-21.
84. Id. at 221. The Commissioner's reasons for turning to tort law for guidance in determining
the proper standard for abuse may be explained more fully in reference to a statement made in June,
1984, by Commissioner Hughes. Statement of Commissioner Hughes to Opinion No. 204-A, 27
F.E.R.C. 61,475 (1984) [hereinafter Commissioner's Statement]. In answer to arguments that tort
law is inapplicable where an action under a federal statute is involved, Commissioner Hughes ex-
amined several federal regulatory schemes and determined that securities regulation (specifically the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)), is analogous to the regulatory
scheme presented in the NGA and the NGPA. "In securities cases, courts have recognized that an
action to recover damages for violation of a federal statute or administrative regulation may be
regarded as a common law action in tort." Commissioner's Statement, 27 F.E.R.C. at 61,904-05
(citing Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972); Junger v. Hertz,
Newmark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970); 79 C.J.S. Securities
Regulation § 129 at 367, 369 Supp. (1982)). Therefore, because securities regulation is analogous to
natural gas regulation, Hughes reasoned that tort concepts are applicable to the statute at hand.
Commissioner's Statement, 27 F.E.R.C. at 61,905. The Consumers' Counsel court made it clear
that, whatever the reason for turning to tort concepts for guidance, the Commission was well within
its rights in adopting a tort standard. "While ... the Commission may turn to other statutes.., for
guidance in its interpretation of 'abuse,' . . . the agency is not compelled to do so." Consumers'
Counsel, 783 F.2d at 221 n. 31 (citing 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 53.03 (rev. 4th ed. 1984)) (emphasis in original).
85. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 221.
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court found the requirement that it have "significant, adverse conse-
quences" on customers or consumers was "inconsistent with the plain
meaning of section 601(c)(2)."'8 6 The FERC was correct that reckless
conduct alone does not justify a denial of passthrough.8 7 However, sec-
tion 601(c)(2) states what effect the reckless conduct must have. Recov-
ery of gas acquisition costs may be denied "to the extent the Commission
determines that the amount paid was excessive due to fraud, abuse, or
similar grounds."88 The effect required for denial of passthrough is an
excessive payment.8 9 "Requiring abuse to encompass a significant ad-
verse effect - i.e., over and above excessive payments - is flatly incon-
sistent with Congress' clear message on this precise issue, and therefore
impermissible."90
The FERC argued that "significant, adverse effect" equalled "exces-
sive payments," but the court held that the two standards are not the
same. The Commission had misguidedly looked to significant market
loss rather than excessive payments as its requirement for denying pass-
through.91 The court concluded that an inspection for excessive pay-
86. Id. at 222; see also supra note 67.
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2) (1982).
89. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 222. The court stated, "Any excessive payment for gas has
a direct effect on customers and consumers because it is normally passed through ...." Id. at 222
n.33 (emphasis in original).
90. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 222. The Commission's interpretation departed from the
court's interpretation when it found that the exception only applies in exceptional circumstances. It
then concluded that, to be an exceptional circumstance, the "conduct must have more than an insig-
nificant effect on the public to be found abusive." Opinion 204-A, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,712-13 (empha-
sis added). Commissioner Hughes argued that while the Commission's significant effect standard
was incorrect, there should nevertheless be some harm to the aggrieved party before abuse is found.
Hughes turned to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 717-717w (1982), and the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (1982) (FPA), stating that these Acts "do not prescribe criteria any more
explicit than that rates charged must be just and reasonable. The Acts are silent as to whether injury
to the complaining party must be shown." Commissioner's Statement, supra note 84, at 61,903. The
Commissioner then cited Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951), in which the court dismissed a complaint under the FPA alleging that the rates paid were
excessive and that constructive fraud had been perpetrated by Northwestern. The Court dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that no harm had been shown as a consequence of the unreasonable
rates. Commissioner's Statement, supra note 84, at 61,903 (citing Montana-Dakota UtiL Co., 341
U.S. at 254). After reviewing several other regulatory schemes, Hughes concluded that "[i]n areas
where explicit standards of conduct have not been prescribed by statute or by regulation, a com-
plaining party has been required to demonstrate that harm has been suffered. The latter situation is
illustrated.., by public utilities regulation where the imprecise statutory standards prescribe just
and reasonable rates." Commissioner's Statement, supra note 84, at 61,903-04.
91. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 223. It may be argued that the only difference between the
court's test and the FERC's is that the FERC looked for a significant market loss to determine if the
price was excessive. "We examined the adverse effects that the parties claimed were the result of
Columbia's conduct, including load loss and increased gas costs." The Commission went on to look
at all of Columbia's practices to determine if it suffered a significant market loss. Opinion 204-A, 26
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ments is always required when an exception to guaranteed passthrough is
sought.92
IV. CONCLUSION
The Consumers' Counsel court held that "abuse" means "reckless
disregard of [the pipeline's] duty" to provide gas at the lowest reasonable
price and that the price paid was "excessive" because of the reckless con-
duct. Under section 601(c) of the NGPA, denial of passthrough may
only be made if both parts of the test are met.93
The court stated that its role as a reviewing court was not "to dic-
tate the particular test that the Commission should use to deny pass-
through."9 4 It remanded to the FERC to further consider the standard
for denial of passthrough in light of the court's interpretation. 95 At the
time of this writing, it has been nearly a year since the court rendered its
decision but the Commission has not yet released a new policy defining
"abuse" under section 601.
Charles Spears
F.E.R.C. at 61,713-32. However, the Commission also stated, "[tihus, only if and to the extent that
abusive conduct actually causes the amount paid for gas to be 'excessive' is passthrough denied."
Opinion 204-A, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,713. If the FERC had determined "the extent that abusive con-
duct actually causes the amount paid for gas to be "excessive," rather than determining "significant
market loss," the court may have found the FERC's interpretation to be permissible.
92. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F.2d at 222. The court specifically stated that "any test for the
exception to guaranteed passthrough must involve an examination for excessive payments for natu-
ral gas. This requirement applies uniformly with respect to all cases of 'fraud,' 'abuse' and 'other
similar grounds' under subsection 601(c)(2)." Id at 222-23.
93. Id. at 212.
94. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
95. Id. Although the court left it up to the Commission, there was language hinting that the
Commission's determination should be the same as the court's interpretation, "[W]e think a reason-
able reading of excessive payment is the difference between what the pipeline actually paid for the
gas and the lower amount it would have paid absent the abusive or fraudulent conduct." Id.
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